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Abstract 
Studies on “Neighbourhood Europeanization” have shown that the EU’s capacity to hit across 
its borders has been limited. Our paper argues that the EU has induced some formal 
institutional change, which, however, has helped to stabilize rather than change existing 
regimes. Thus, we do observe the Europeanization of domestic structures of formerly Soviet 
republics, which, however, appears to have opposite effects of what the EU intends to achieve 
with its ENP. In order to explore these pathologies of Europeanization, we focus on the EU’s 
attempts to promote good governance, and in particular the fight against corruption. The Post-
Soviet area features some of the most corrupt countries in the world, including the Southern 
Caucasus region. High adaptation costs and limited incentives render Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
and Georgia least likely cases for Europeanization and domestic change. Our comparative 
study will show that despite high misfit and low pressure for adaptation from above and 
below, all three have responded to the EU’s demands for good governance introducing similar 
formal institutional changes. Yet, rather than systematically fighting corruption, incumbent 
regimes have instrumentalized the EU selectively implementing anti-corruption policies to cut 
the power resources of their political opponents. 
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1. Introduction 
With the borders of the EU having moved eastwards, students of Europeanization have been 
awarded yet another real-world experiment. As in case of the accession countries, the EU 
seeks to transform the domestic structures of the Newly Independent States (NIS) that used to 
be part of the Soviet Union and now form the immediate backyard of the EU. In order to 
foster peace, stability and prosperity in its near abroad, the EU seeks to build a ‘ring of 
friends’ (European Commission 2003) that share the same norms and principles of good 
governance as the EU and its member states and adapt their domestic institutions and policies 
accordingly. Unlike the CEE countries, the Western Balkans and Turkey, however, the 
European neighbourhood countries (ENC) appear to be stuck in transition and suffer from 
serious problems of both weak state capacity and defect democracy. Moreover, they do not 
have a membership perspective, at least not in the foreseeable future.  
Studies on “Neighbourhood Europeanization” (Gawrich et al. 2009) have shown that the EU’s 
capacity to hit across its borders has been limited (Smith 2005; Weber et al. 2007; Sasse 
2008; Kelley 2005; Lavenex 2004). Our paper argues that the EU has induced some formal 
institutional change, which, however, has helped to stabilize rather than change existing 
regimes. Thus, we do observe the Europeanization of domestic structures of formerly Soviet 
republics, which, however, appears to have opposite effects of what the EU intends to achieve 
with its ENP. In order to explore these pathologies of Europeanization, we focus on the EU’s 
attempts to promote good governance, and in particular the fight against corruption. The Post-
Soviet area features some of the most corrupt countries in the world, including the Southern 
Caucasus region. High adaptation costs and limited incentives render Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
and Georgia least likely cases for Europeanization and domestic change. Our comparative 
study will show that despite high misfit and low pressure for adaptation from above and 
below, all three have responded to the EU’s demands for good governance introducing similar 
formal institutional changes. Yet, rather than systematically fighting corruption, incumbent 
regimes have instrumentalized the EU selectively implementing anti-corruption policies to cut 
the power resources of their political opponents.  
The first part of the paper develops a ‘bottom-up’ perspective on Europeanization and 
(unintended) domestic change focusing on how domestic actors have used the EU to advance 
their interests consolidating rather than changing existing power structures. The second part 
compares how Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia have responded to EU demands for 
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domestic change looking at the fight against corruption, which forms the core of the EU’s 
good governance agenda. We will show how all three regimes introduced similar formal 
institutions and also engaged in some anti-corruption activities. Yet, the domestic changes we 
observe are less driven by EU pressure for adaptation. Rather, the incumbent regimes have 
managed to instrumentalize the fight against corruption to consolidate their power. As a 
result, Europeanization tends to stabilize rather than transform governance structures in the 
Southern Caucasus. 
 
2. The Dark Side of Europeanization 
Approaches to Europeanization and domestic change have been increasingly criticized for 
their rather narrow top-down perspective which conceptualizes the process largely as a one-
way street, and treating target countries as passive recipients of EU demands for change 
(Olsen 2002; Kohler-Koch 2003; Jacquot and Woll 2003). Domestic actors have other choices 
in responding to Europeanization than endorsing or resisting EU induced reforms; they can 
instrumentalize EU policies and institutions to advance their own interests decoupling them 
from their normative contents. Europeanization approaches have identified the differential 
empowerment of domestic actors as a key mechanism of domestic change (see introduction). 
Yet, they assume that those empowered are reform-minded or liberal coalitions that pressure 
or argue in favour of compliance with EU requirements. While veto players can still impede 
domestic change if they are powerful enough, students of Europeanization have turned a blind 
eye to the possibility that opponents of EU reforms can also use the EU to advance their 
power and interest, inducing some domestic change, which, however, goes in the opposite 
direction of the EU’s intentions (but see Elbasani 2009; Noutcheva 2009). 
In short, Europeanization can have unintended and negative effects on the domestic structures 
of states. EU policies and institutions do not only empower liberal reform coalitions, to the 
extent that they exist in the first place, but can also bolster the power of incumbent 
authoritarian and corrupt elites. In order to capture this ‘dark side of Europeanization’ 
(Schimmelfennig 2007), we will conceptualize the European Neighbourhood Policy as a 
political opportunity structure that provides opportunities and constraints to both supporters 
and opponents of the EU’s reform agenda. Which of the two gets ultimately empowered 
depends not only on the EU’s push for reforms but also on the pull of domestic actors. The 
degree of political liberalization and statehood of the countries targeted by the EU have a 
3 
crucial influence on both the EU push and the domestic pull and therefore provide important 
scope conditions for the ways in which EU incentives empower domestic actors. 
The power to transform (EU push) 
Adopting the EU’s agenda for good governance entails significant costs for target countries. 
In general, the costs of adaptation for incumbent governments of democratic states with 
market economies are lower than for authoritarian regimes, which have a firm grip on 
economy and society. Since the EU cannot legally coerce or militarily force third countries 
into good governance, the EU’s power to transform the domestic structure of third countries is 
limited to changing the behaviour of governments through incentives and socialization. 
The European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI) features three types of 
instruments in this regard which directly relate to two direct mechanisms of diffusion 
identified in the introduction, incentives and socialization. Firstly, capacity-building 
programmes provide technical and financial assistance geared towards building institutions 
and capacities that are necessary to facilitate reform. The unconditional transfer of resources 
and know-how strengthens the capacity of governments to cope with the reform agenda 
(assistance) and act upon the incentives provided by the EU. They may also give 
governmental actors the necessary funds and/or legitimacy to address undesirable social or 
economic consequences (Jacoby 2006). Secondly, the EU can use political dialogue to win 
over the minds of governmental actors through persuasion and social learning. Political 
dialogue aims at socialization of the target government into the norms and rules the EU seeks 
to promote. Finally, external incentives allow manipulating the cost/benefit calculations of 
governments. Whereas institutional or financial benefits reward improved (future) behaviour 
(positive conditionality), ex-post sanctions are imposed on undesirable behaviour and 
withhold or suspend benefits for target countries (negative conditionality).  
The EU’s tool box is mostly geared towards pushing governments to introduce domestic 
reforms. It also seeks to enlist the help of domestic non-state actors providing them with 
financial and technical resources, giving them access to transnational networks, and 
pressuring government to involve them into the reform process (Börzel et al. 2008). 
While the ENP is a one-size-fits all framework, EU push has varied across countries. The 
economic and political power of the EU renders its external relations with neighbouring 
countries rather asymmetric. In principle, the ENC have much more to gain with closer 
relations with the EU giving the EU more power. However, some states possess resources 
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(gas, oil) the EU is interested in, are of strategic importance, have the potential to create 
substantial negative externalities for the EU (illegal immigration, cross-border crime) or have 
alternative allies or loyalties at their disposal (Way and Levitsky 2007). Strategic or economic 
goals can seriously undermine the consistency of the EU in pushing for domestic change, 
particularly if the target countries do not posses a membership perspective (Maier and 
Schimmelfennig 2007; Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2009). As we have shown elsewhere, the 
mix of instruments on which the EU relies is heavily influenced by the degree of 
liberalization and statehood of the target country. The more democratic a regime and the more 
consolidated its statehood, the more likely the EU is to use incentives, as it has done in the 
case of Georgia, while Armenia and Azerbaijan, which are more authoritarian and whose 
statehood is more limited have been mostly exposed to socialization and capacity-building 
(Börzel and Pamuk and Stahn 2008). 
The domestic context of the target countries is not only an important factor in mitigating the 
EU’s push; it also decisive in shaping the response of domestic actors to EU demands for 
change. 
The disposition to perform (domestic pull) 
The EU’s external push is not sufficient to induce domestic change (Jacoby 2006). Several 
studies have demonstrated that it requires a significant pull by domestic actors, particularly if 
governments are reluctant to face the costs of adaptation (Kelley 2004; Zielonka and Pravda 
2001; Vachudova 2005).  
Target governments are not passive recipients of the EU’s demands for change. The higher 
the costs of adaptation (misfit), the more likely they are to resist compliance, particularly if 
domestic veto players oppose domestic change. If, by contrast, norm entrepreneurs and 
reform coalitions are pulling EU policies and institutions down to the domestic level, the 
resistance of governments and veto players may be overcome. High push and pull makes 
Europeanization more likely and vice versa. In the rare cases, where low push combines with 
high pull, chances of Europeanization are still good. High push and low pull, by contrast, will 
not result in much domestic impact of the EU since governments have no reason to face the 
externally induced adaptation costs and the resistance of domestic veto players. 
If these theoretical expectations of the Europeanization literature hold, the prospects of the 
EU’s attempt to promote good governance in the Southern Caucasus look rather bleak. 
Human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and the fight against corruption require 
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institutional reforms that challenge the political survival of semi-authoritarian regimes that 
often rely on clientelistic networks rather than outright repression to stay in power. Their 
resistance against domestic change should therefore be high. Given the lack of a membership 
perspective, the economic and political interests of the EU in the stability of the region and 
the access to its energy resources and the competition with Russia over its backyard, the EU 
has hardly any leverage to push for domestic reforms. Domestic pull, finally is likely to be 
equally weak. While the lack of pluralistic institutions gives potential veto players not much 
of a voice, civil society organizations are too weak to act as norm entrepreneurs. High costs, 
combined with low external push and domestic pull make the Southern Caucasus a least likely 
case for Europeanization. Indeed, the transformative power of the EU has been very limited – 
despite or rather because of the domestic changes the three neighbourhood countries have 
introduced in response to the EU’s demand to fight corruption.  
Our case studies will show that we do find instances of Europeanization, which has, however, 
stabilized rather than transformed domestic structures. The pathologies of Europeanization are 
explained by the successful strategy of incumbent government to selectively adopt anti-
corruption measures pushed by the EU’s good governance agenda to advance their own 
interests and consolidate their power.  
 
3. External Push and Domestic Pull in the Southern Caucasus 
High misfit, prohibitive costs and limited EU push 
Since the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, the relationships between the EU and the 
Eastern Neighbourhood Countries (ENC) have evolved in several steps each envisaging a 
further intensification of the bilateral cooperation. Likewise, the EU’s demand for improving 
governance by engaging in substantial domestic reforms has increased significantly over the 
past years. When Eastern enlargement placed Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia into the EU’s 
immediate vicinity, the fear of political instability, organized crime and illegal migration 
induced the EU to once again deploy its transformative power this time trying to hit beyond 
its borders. The European Neighbourhood Policy launched in 2004 aims at fostering peace, 
stability, and prosperity in the EU’s new near abroad (ENP, European Commission 2004). 
The ENP serves the purpose to build a “ring of friends” (European Commission 2003: 4) that 
share European norms and principles and are willing to adapt their domestic institutions and 
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policies respectively. Generally speaking, the ENP reform agenda includes three major 
dimensions: democracy promotion, market integration and (energy) security cooperation 
(Weber and Smith and Baun 2007). Good governance constitutes a key cross cutting issue 
that is mainstreamed into the Action Plans (AP) concluded with all three countries in 2006 
after they had been included in the ENP. It covers issues such as improving electoral 
legislation, conducting free and fair elections, ensuring the separation of power (particularly 
with regard to the judiciary), encouraging the development of political parties and civil 
society organizations, granting the independence of media, protecting human rights and civil 
liberties (particularly minority rights) and fighting corruption (Börzel et al. 2010). 
In order to promote this ambitious reform agenda, the European Commission has heavily 
relied on the top-down methods and instruments of its former accession policy with regard to 
the CEE countries (Kelley 2006). When it comes to the practical application of the Action 
Plans in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, the EU has clearly focused on enhancing the 
effectiveness of state institutions in providing public goods and services rather than promoting 
democracy and human rights (Börzel and Stahn and Pamuk 2010). Its emphasis on output-
related reforms reflects a preference for political stability over democratic change (Börzel et 
al. 2009). Still, making state institutions more effective implies a strong emphasis on the fight 
against corruption, which implies huge costs of adaptation. 
The Southern Caucasus countries have ranged among the most corrupt countries in the world, 
although scope and form of corruption differ. While Georgia has significantly improved its 
record since the Rose Revolution, the situation has remained more or less stable in Azerbaijan 
and has deteriorated in Armenia (see figure 1). Despite the differences, corruption is pervasive 
in all three countries, including Georgia. Tightly organized patronage networks permeate the 
public sphere and help sustain a stable equilibrium of informal institutions through “vertical 
organization and horizontal coordination of corruption” (Johnston 1999: 15). The extensive 
misuse of social networks for particularistic purposes favours certain political interests and 
excludes others from the distribution of public goods (Drury et al. 2006; Stokes 2007). 
Finally, uncontested control of the incumbent regime, the lack of economic alternatives, and a 
comparatively weak civil society further add to the institutionalization of oligarchic 
monopolies (Shleifer and Vishny 1993). Corruption does not only yield huge private rents but 
also allows incumbent elites to control the access to power and resources securing the loyalty 
of key domestic actors (International Crisis Group 2004).  
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Figure 1: Corruption in the Southern Caucasus 
TI Corruption Perception Index Armenia Georgia Azerbaijan 
2004 (rank out of 146 countries) 3.1 (82.) 2.0 (133.) 1.9 (140.)  
2006 (rank out of 163 countries) 2.9 (93.) 2.8 (99.) 2.4 (130.) 
2008 (rank out of 180 countries) 2.9 (109.) 3.9 (67.) 1.9 (158.) 
2010 (rank out of 178 countries) 2.6 (123.) 3.8 (68.) 2.4 (134.) 
Source: Transparency International 2004, 2008, 2010, http://www.transparency.org (last 
access 3 October 2010). The scale ranges from 0 (high corruption) to 10 (low corruption) 
 
The EU Action Plans ask the three Caucasian neighbourhood countries (CNC) to accede, 
ratify and implement international conventions that are related to the fight against corruption, 
including the UN convention on Corruption, the Council of Europe Criminal and Civil Law 
Conventions or the OECD Convention on combating bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions. Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan have agreed to join 
international anti-corruption networks such as GRECO and implement their recommendations 
in order to advance legislative or institutional reforms in this regard. Finally, each country has 
some additional provisions that largely concentrate on promoting anti-corruption measures 
within the administration and/or the law enforcement agencies or improving the legal 
framework for the prosecution of corruption-related crimes. The required actions are quite 
similar for the three Southern Caucasus states, and slightly vary with regard to the specificity 
of certain measures (cf. Börzel and Pamuk and Stahn 2008). 
All three CNC have negotiated with the EU a rather ambitious reform agenda, which 
constitutes a comprehensive misfit with domestic institutions, policies and political processes. 
The legal and administrative changes required by the EU challenge the political survival of 
incumbent elites who often rely on clientelistic networks rather than outright repression to 
stay in power. 
Yet, the EU has not exerted sufficient external push to generate pressure for adaptation that 
could trigger domestic change. The European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern 
Partnership were explicitly designed to provide an alternative to membership. Basically, they 
offer deeper cooperation and economic integration in exchange for political and economic 
reforms. While the EU cannot invoke accession conditionality to push for domestic change, it 
may (threaten to) suspend bilateral agreements, withhold assistance, and impose political 
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sanctions (e.g. visa bans). Likewise, the EU can reward progress by upgrading bilateral 
relations (e.g. association agreements), lifting trade restrictions (e.g. deep and comprehensive 
trade agreement), simplifying visa regimes or extending the scope of assistance. These 
possibilities notwithstanding, the EU has been very reluctant to use conditionality. The CNC 
have felt little pressure to engage in domestic reforms to meet ENP goals and requirements. It 
has almost exclusively relied on capacity-building and political dialogue. Only once has the 
EU invoked negative conditionality, when it restricted the provision of technical and financial 
assistance to Georgia in 2003 due to a lack of progress in fighting corruption (cf. Börzel and 
Stahn and Pamuk 2010).  
The strategy of promoting reforms through positive incentives, in turn, has not only been 
hampered by only vaguely defined reform goals and the absence of any benchmarks for 
measuring progress. Closer relations with the EU have little attraction for countries that face 
extremely high adaptation costs in approximating the EU (all CNC), aspire nothing less than 
membership (Georgia), command control over substantial resources (Azerbaijan), or maintain 
close relations with Russia (Armenia). 
The denial of a membership perspective also mitigates the prospects of socialization and 
social learning. Human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance form the 
basic values on which the partnership between the EU and the CNC shall be based. Rather 
than imposing “a pre-determined set of priorities” (European Commission 2004: 8), the EU 
has sought to use political dialogue based on partnership, joint commitment and ownership. 
The fight against corruption has been an issue of political dialogue in all three countries. Yet, 
the joint translation of reform priorities into specific measures has been hampered by vaguely 
defined goals, the lack of timeframes and the absence of responsible agencies (cf. Börzel and 
Stahn and Pamuk 2010). Thus, it is hard to say to what extent political dialogue has fostered 
socialization and social learning processes. The resonance of EU norms and values with the 
domestic institutions of the CNC is far lower than in case of the CEE countries. Moreover,. 
Unlike in the CEE accession process, the EU has done little to empower non-state actors in 
the CNC. Since 2004, the EU requires ENP partner governments to consult and cooperate 
with non-state actors and civil organizations in the formulation and implementation of the 
national reform agendas. Yet, the EU has hardly enforced this requirement. Unlike in other 
foreign policy frameworks, it has also refrained from upgrading the status of non-state actors 
within the political dialogue (Börzel and Stahn and Pamuk 2010). The new Eastern 
Partnership Civil Society Forum, which shall facilitate a dialogue between the CNC 
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governments and local civil society organizations (CSO), has done little so far to change this 
(Boonstra and Shapovalova 2010). 
Weak pull and strategic elites 
While EU push has been limited, there is not much domestic pull either. The importance of 
civil society organisations in fighting corruption in transition countries is widely recognized. 
Civil society organizations play a vital role in monitoring government actions and making 
sure that the reforms respect both national and international laws. In lack of state capacity, 
civil society organisations may also provide an alternative source of knowledge and expertise 
that enhances to the quality of the anti-corruption programs (cf. Demidov and Panfilova 
2001). 
Despite signs that civil organisations in the Southern Caucasus have been benefitting from 
external capacity-building and transnational linkages with Western NGOs, trade unions and 
party foundations, their role in public life and policy is rather low. The idea of an autonomous 
civil society is still a largely foreign concept in the post-Soviet Southern Caucasus. Moreover, 
most local organizations tend to function as all-purpose advocacy agencies focusing on a 
variety of issues that are perceived as important, ranging from democracy building through 
poverty alleviation to childcare. In many cases this has resulted in a dilution of expertise and 
dissipation of resources. Finally, many of the local civil society groups are small-scale 
organizations with limited personnel that often are hardly equipped to deal with essential 
technical details. As a consequence, most domestic non-state actors do not have sufficient 
organizational and ideational resources to mobilize larger parts of the society. This lack of 
capacity has often served as a pretext for government actors to deny civil society 
organizations access to the policy process. Additionally, the channelling of resources for civil 
society building has frequently given rise to a short-lived mushrooming of NGOs that – in the 
worst case – use external funding as a mere opportunity for income generation (Matveeva 
2008).  
Next to limited capacities, the low degree of political liberalization of the CNC circumscribes 
the political autonomy of civil society. A notable exception was the democratic surge of the 
Rose Revolution in Georgia that was mainly championed by various grassroots organizations 
in 2004. The promising event, however, did not bring about democratic consolidation, as the 
recent events of the 2008 war illustrate (Laverty 2008; Tudoroiu 2007). In Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, the situation is even worse. Rule of law and democracy are weakly 
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institutionalized as a result of which political rights and civil liberties are severely limited. 
Domestic activists, who engage in politically and economically sensitive areas, such as the 
fight against corruption, live in constant danger to be assaulted or prosecuted on the basis of 
false accusations and fictitious evidence. Finally, governing elites have victimized potential 
change agents, denying business actors and civil society organizations self-sustainable income 
opportunities if they refuse to being co-opted into the clientele system (Laverty 2008; 
Karatnycky 2001). 
Business is to a significant extent controlled by clientelistic interests in all three CNC. 
Gradual economic reforms and in-transparent privatization processes cemented a close 
affiliation of the economic and the political sphere. Domestic companies lack the incentives to 
press for introducing a sound economic framework and the rule of law, precisely because they 
benefit from market distortions. Although multinational companies have sought access to the 
CNC, particularly to the energy sector in Azerbaijan, they have little interest in spoiling their 
relationship with the incumbent regime by pushing for domestic reforms (Hoff and Stiglitz 
2004). 
 
4. Fighting Corruption in the Southern Caucasus 
The EU has formulated similar demands for the fight against corruption in Georgia, Armenia 
and Azerbaijan, causing similar misfit. Limited statehood and democracy have largely 
prevented this misfit from translating into systematic pressure for adaptation from above and 
from below. Yet, despite high costs and low pressure, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia have 
adopted and implemented anti-corruption measures.  
Introducing institutional change 
All three CNC have ratified and given effect to the major international conventions on the 
fight against corruption (cf. Börzel and Stahn and Pamuk 2010). In order to abide with their 
international obligations, the governments of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan have 
introduced a number of institutional changes. They have developed anti-corruption strategies 
and anti-corruption action plans, which are drafted by Anti-Corruption Councils and whose 
implementation is supervised by special Commissions. Moreover, the Prosecutor-Offices are 
charged with the investigation and prosecution of crimes related to corruption. Finally, 
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Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan have introduced several legislative changes by introducing 
new legislation and amending existing laws. 
Overall, the three Southern Caucasus Countries have introduced similar institutions to meet 
the demand of the EU and other international actors to fight corruption. Given the high misfit 
and low pressure for adaption, the extent of the domestic changes we observe is not trivial. 
We should at least see some decoupling, which would also explain why corruption has 
remained stable in Azerbaijan and even increased in Armenia (figure 1). Yet, as the next 
section will show, all three governments have implemented anti-corruption measures. These 
changes have not been induced by EU incentives and socialization efforts. They are driven by 
the differential empowerment of incumbent elites that have instrumentalized the fight against 
corruption to undermine the power of their political opponents. As a result, Europeanization 
has had little effect on the informal institutions of clientelism and patronage. EU demands for 
fighting corruption have helped to stabilize rather than transform bad governance in the 
Southern Caucasus. 
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Figure 2: Domestic Institutional Change in the Southern Caucasus 
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Azerbaijan: Settling Internal Power Struggles 
Azerbaijan has undertaken quite some changes to fight corruption and the European 
Commission as well as the OECD have acknowledged the progress the country has made 
(European Commission 2006: 4; OECD/ ACN 2010). Yet, its efforts do not seem to have 
much effect on levels of corruption (see figure 1). Somewhat paradoxically, this is not only 
due to a decoupling of formal institutions and behavioural practices as suggested by the 
literature (Grono 2010; Bertelsmann Stiftung 2010). Rather the Azeri government has been 
quite selective in implementing and enforcing anti-corruption measures in such a way as to 
consolidate their power by disciplining political rivals and centralizing the control over the 
corruption system. 
Azerbaijan’s formal political system is characterized by a strong concentration of power in the 
hands of the executive branch controlled by the president and his apparatus (Franke et al. 
2009). In the shadow of these formal institutions, the president relies on an informal division 
of power in which various networks headed by powerful individuals compete with each other 
(International Crisis Group 2010). The leaders of these aligned networks hold the so-called 
‘power ministries’ of interior, defence, and national security. The inner circle of the ruling 
clique is embedded in a wider network of allies that do not share power as such but participate 
in the control and distribution of financial and economic resources. It mostly consists of 
businessmen or so-called oligarchs that have been promoted to ‘secondary’ positions in 
government (International Crisis Group 2010). The president and his extended family network 
control the ruling clique of ministers and their respective networks. The president acts as a 
gatekeeper to power and resources. Furthermore, he controls all exchanges within the various 
aligned networks and mediates in cases of conflict among its leaders. The presidential 
administration in turn, is headed by one of his most powerful allies and functions as a hub that 
brokers and coordinates power in the political system (Collins 2004; Wedel 2003). 
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Round – Compliance record of Georgia, adopted on 15th May, 2009, Greco RC-II (2008) 9E, Strasbourg, 
http://www.justice.gov.ge/files/Documents/analitikuri/GrecoRC2%282008%299_Georgia_EN_-
_compliance_report_-_2nd_evaluation_round.pdf6.pdf (last access 3 December 2010).  
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The fight against corruption has become to play a role in calibrating this informal system of 
clan politics. The incumbent regime has instrumentalized anti-corruption policies to settle 
internal power struggles and tighten his grip on the exchange of resources. Like all other 
major policies, the president initiates and regulates anti-corruption measures by presidential 
decree, the executive’s “frequently used mechanism of governance” (Shaffer 2004: 29), which 
is exempt from any substantial judicial or legislative oversight. Furthermore, the head of the 
presidential administration concomitantly also chairs the State Civil Service Committee as 
well as the Commission for Combating Corruption, which puts him in a key power position 
(International Crisis Group 2010). In addition, crucial areas that affect the formulation and 
implementation of anti-corruption policies, such as the budget approval process, the 
institutional setup, investigation and internal auditing mechanisms, and the office of the 
ombudsman are ultimately subject to presidential competences. The legislative and judiciary 
branches mainly carry out the function of confirming presidential policies.4 
The overpowering presidential administration thus monopolizes the anti-corruption agenda 
and dominates all other agencies charged with the fight against corruption (Badalov and 
Mehdy 2005). The executive’s excessive control of the country’s anti-corruption agenda 
allows for a selective implementation of EU demands to direct the flow of spoils and to 
eliminate income opportunities that could empower self-sustainable competitors beyond the 
president’s and his closest ally’s control. Likewise, the Anti-corruption Commission and the 
Department for Combating Corruption have been unwilling to take on close allies of the 
president (International Crisis Group 2010) 
A prominent example is the case of Ali Insanov, who was one of the original founders of the 
ruling Yəni Azərbaycan party and once considered one of Azerbaijan’s most influential 
cabinet members. Heading the so-called Yeraz network, a small but influential group of 
ethnic Azerbaijanis from Armenia, Insanov had played an active part in the 1993 return of the 
Aliyev family to power. As remuneration the Yeraz network became junior partner in ruling 
power arrangement and its leader was appointed health minister. In 2005, Insanov fell from 
grace for a ‘squaring of accounts’ with rivalling factions within the ruling clique. Since 2003, 
the influence of the Yeraz network had gradually declined as the leadership changed from 
Aliyev Senior to Aliyev Junior (Sidikov 2004; Avioutskii 2007). Accused of corruption and 
abuse of power, Insanov was stripped off all his offices and put on trial in 2007. A similar 
                                                 
4
  Freedom House: Nations in Transit, 2008; Country Report on Azerbaijan, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=445&year=2008 (last access 27 November 2010). 
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case exhibits the more complex side of the power arrangement. At first sight, ex-minister of 
economic development Farhad Aliyev (no relation with the president) also fell victim to a 
rivalry among the so-called oligarch group of business interests close to the ruling circle. 5 
Aliyev was said to belong to a ‘new guard’ of politicians that were reckoned (mostly by the 
West) as reform-minded, Western-educated allies of the young president. Some observers 
claim that Aliyev clashed and lost over spoils with a fellow minister and protégée of the ‘old 
guard’ headed by the chairman of the presidential apparatus.6 Other sources, however, claim 
that Aliyev was punished for trying to deceive his patron in financial matters. In any case, 
Aliyev was charged with a coup attempt, corruption and abuse of office, embezzlement of 
state property, smuggling and tax evasion and, together with Insanov, convicted to several 
years of imprisonment.7 
In sum, the efforts of Azerbaijan’s authorities to fight corruption have focused on 
strengthening the state apparatus, expanding its control over society and fostering the power 
of the incumbents. The government has requested EU technical assistance and twinning 
projects for central state agencies. Genuine public participation and civil oversight, by 
contrast, is not part of the scheme. On the contrary, the regime has used corruption allegations 
to control its own camp and to undermine civil society actors and representatives of the media 
who have become too critical of the authorities.8 Although the level of corruption has not 
decreased, its forms and scope have changed. Next to administrative corruption including 
outright bottom-up bribing and decentralized instances of extortion, political corruption has 
gained prominence and together with anti-corruption has become part of a sophisticated 
governance system controlled by the incumbent elites (International Crisis Group 2010).  
Armenia: Pleasing External Donors 
Armenia has been under strong pressure of international donors and its Diaspora to reduce the 
ever growing corruption. Its government has adopted and implemented anti-corruption 
measures. However, corruption has increased rather than decreased (figure 1), which is at 
least partly due to a similar instrumentalization of the fight against corruption as we observe it 
                                                 
5
 Cf. Azerbaijan: Ex-Minister’s Trial Creates Political Sensation, March 5, 2007; www.Eurasianet.org (last 
access 30 September 2010). 
6
 Cf. Rovshan Ismayilov “Azerbaijan’s Emergency Ministry becomes Power Base” March 8, 2006 available at 
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav030906.shtml (last access 30 September 2010). 
7
 BBC Worldwide Monitoring Service, Trans Caucasus Unit September 10, 2008. The property of both ex-
ministers was confiscated and auction in favour of the treasury in 2009. 
8
  Freedomhouse: Nations in Transit, 2008; Country Report on Azerbaijan, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=445&year=2008 (last access 27 November 2010). 
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in Azerbaijan, albeit with a different purpose. Rather than undermining the power of political 
opposition, the Armenian government has used the fight against corruption to deflect 
international criticism ensuring external aid and attracting foreign direct investment 
The incumbent regime in Armenia is more united than that of Azerbaijan. Its locus of power 
mainly rests with the security apparatus, including the armed forces and related veteran 
organizations such as the Yerkrapah (Bedevian and Stepanian 2006). In addition, Armenia’s 
historical irredentism as well as the Karabakh conflict have created a strong sense of national 
identity that has bound together the country’s various rivalling elite factions and makes them 
more reluctant to engage in internal power struggles. At the same time, power conflicts 
coagulate along nationalistic issues (Karabakh and Turkey) rather than personal feuds 
(Hovannisian 2008), which renders the use of anti-corruption measures more difficult. Most 
importantly, the power balance within government is organized differently than in Azerbaijan. 
A ‘hyper’-executive with wide-reaching competences dominates the state apparatus, too 
(Shahnazaryan 2003). However, the parliament plays a comparatively stronger role in the 
informal power arrangement than in Azerbaijan. In order to protect their businesses from the 
grasp of the incumbent elite within the state apparatus, the so-called oligarchs have 
increasingly assumed membership in parliament.9 Furthermore, genuine political parties that 
enjoy support from the influential Diaspora organizations have succeeded in building a 
stronghold in parliament (Dudwick 1993). As a consequence, Armenia’s president relies on a 
much broader range of influential network leaders as well as organizations. He seeks to strike 
a balance between different elite groupings within the security apparatus, the executive and to 
a lesser extent the parliament. 
Similar to Azerbaijan, corruption clean-ups serve as an instrument of internal power struggle. 
However, this occurs on a much lower regime level, including purges in the judiciary and 
medium-level state bureaucracy. As the case of the 1999 parliamentary shooting 
demonstrates, serious high-level infighting is ‘solved’ by other means.10 
Even more important than settling internal power struggles, the fight against corruption serves 
the incumbent regime to attract external resources. Armenia is much more dependent on 
external financial aid than Azerbaijan (Libaridian 2004). In 1994, Armenia suffered a 
considerable economic setback due to the closure of its borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan. 
                                                 
9
  Freedom House: Nations in Transit, 2008; Country Report on Armenia, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=444&year=2008 (last access 27 November 2010). 
10
 David Hoffman “Parliament attacked in Armenia,” The Washington Post, 28 October 1999. 
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As a consequence of this regional isolation, business opportunities are limited and Armenia’s 
economy is heavily dominated by oligarchic monopolies. At the same time, the nationalistic 
Armenian Diaspora is quite influential in domestic politics. Consisting of very disparate 
groupings including various organizations and parties in the United States, France, and the 
Lebanon, the Diaspora provides considerable financial aid and other resources to the country 
(Gillespie and Okruhlik 1991; International Organization for Migration 2008). Yet, corruption 
and take-overs of shares by the state have been a major impediment for Diaspora investors. 
“If patriotism helps to buy a ticket to visit Armenia, it is not enough of an argument to part 
with one’s life savings, without any guarantee of profit, and without any state protection.11 
This holds also true, of course, for foreign investors. 
With the country’s ever more rampant corruption (see figure 1), Diaspora organizations have 
supported the implementation of domestic reforms of the public administration and judiciary, 
customs, tax, education, public health and other sectors.12 Under increasing international 
pressure, the Armenian government launched some publicly visible attempts to crack down 
corruption, including the sacking of corrupt officials in the tax department, customs service 
and police. Given their lack of systemic effect, such changes in personnel have been criticized 
for being merely symbolic.13  
 
In sum, anti-corruption policies have mostly served to please the international donor 
community and attract foreign direct investments in order to overcome the economic isolation 
of the country. With no need to control the flow of rents and to eliminate political rivals, the 
Armenian government has addressed political and administrative corruption only 
symbolically as to avoid the discontent of international donor organizations.  
Georgia: Consolidating New Power Structures 
In the first decade after its transition, Georgia had done little to fight the pervasive corruption 
that crippled its state institutions and its economy (Darchiashvili and Nodia 2003; Kikabidze 
                                                 
11
  Tatoul Manaseryan (MP) 2004: Diaspora – The Comparative Advantage for Armenia, in: Armenian 
International Policy research Working paper Series, No. 14: 19, 
http://www.aiprg.net/UserFiles/File/wp/jan2004/14.pdf (last access 27 November 2010).  
12
  Transparency International Armenia 2006: Anti-Corruption Policy in Armenia, 
http://www.transparency.am/publication.php?id=24 (last access 27 November 2010), cf. also Liana 
Aghajanyan “Diaspora Conference Examines issues of Corruption and Income Inequalities in Yerevan,” 
Eurasianet 6 December 2010, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/62513 (last access 13 December 2010). 
13
  Grigoryan, Marianna 2008: Armenia: Getting Serious about Corruption?, 
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav071108.shtml (last access 22 November 2010). 
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and Losaberidze 2000). Only when external donors started to voice their discontent 
threatening to withdraw their support, President Shevardnadze introduced some formal 
changes. Much earlier than his counterparts in the region, he declared 1997 the year of the 
“crusade against corruption” (McGiffert Ekedahl and Goodman 2001: 12) and the 
government launched its first anti-corruption campaign. At the same time, however, 
Shevardnadze made sure that he remained the ‘gatekeeper’ to international financial aid. In 
order to build and maintain power, the president used these resources to ensure the support of 
various power brokers and warlords that were willing to support him. In exchange for their 
subordination, these power brokers were given the right to control and exploit certain sectors, 
in particular import and export, and take their share of revenues. As a result, vested interests 
and organized crime increasingly undermined the state apparatus (Wheatley and Zürcher 
2008). In September 2001, the minister of justice, Mikheil Saakashvili, left the government 
and founded an opposition party, the United National Movement, pledging to take issue with 
the Shevardnadze government over corruption. 
After Shevardnadze had tried to steal the vote in the 2003 elections, mass popular protests and 
international pressure forced him to resign from office. With presidential and parliamentary 
elections, Mikheil Saakashvili and his party could secure large parts of the electoral support. 
He declared the fight against corruption to be the core of his government policies (Wheatley 
2005). The new government immediately took action against corruption within the law 
enforcement agencies, which resulted in the complete dismantling of the traffic police, which 
had been considered as one of the most corrupt institutions of the country. 15.000 officers lost 
their jobs practically overnight. In addition, a special force of 30.000 men and women 
attached to the Ministry of Interior was dissolved and all members fired. Reforms of the 
police forces continued with investments in modern equipment, the creation of a new Police 
Academy, mandatory exams and training for police officers, and considerable increases in the 
salaries. At the same time, draconian fines for minor offences were adopted. Petty corruption 
was upgraded as a serious crime, warranting several years of imprisonment (Boda and 
Kakachia 2005; Hiscock 2005). 
Like his predecessor, Saakashvili placed the fight against corruption under the direct control 
of his government. Since 2006 and 2008, respectively, the Minister of State Reform and the 
Minister of Justice, who heads the Inter-Agency Coordination Council of Combating 
Corruption, have been charged with the drafting and implementation of anti-corruption 
policies. While state authorities resolutely targeted petty corruption at lower levels of 
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bureaucracy, Sakaashvili has been accused of turning a blind eye to major corruption and 
abuse of power among his closest allies he had allegedly placed in many prominent positions. 
Similar to Azerbaijan, corruption has not been eradicated but rather transmogrified into elite 
corruption (Chiabrishvili 2009). Next to rewarding his closest associates, Saakashvili has also 
used the fight against corruption to oust political opponents. When the former minister of 
defence and close associate of Saakashvili, Irakli Okrushvili, left the government in 2006, 
formed an opposition party, and accused the President of numerous crimes, he was arrested on 
corruption charges. A court found him guilty of large-scale extortion and sentenced him to 11 
years in prison. What was widely perceived as political persecution sparked mass protests and 
contributed to the rise of antigovernment rallies in 2008.14 Finally, the eradication of 
entrenched corruption has helped to boost foreign direct investments and economic 
stabilization. The EU, the IMF and other international actors, which had suspended assistance 
before the Rose Revolution, stepped up their financial support for Georgia’s new government. 
The EU almost doubled its support;15 the net official development assistance and official aid 
increased by more than 10 times between 2002 and 2007; so did the foreign direct 
investments.16 In 2006, the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation declared 
Georgia the “best reformer in the world” regarding its business environment.17 The fight 
against corruption is an integral part of the liberal economic reforms the Saakashvili 
government has been pushing. While the minister of state reforms, Kakha Bendukidze, has 
pushed privatization as a major solution to corruption, he claims that anti-corruption measures 
promote economic growth by scrapping ineffective public institutions (European Stability 
Initiative 2010). 
In sum, the Saakashvili regime has successfully used anti-corruption measures to break up 
and replace the power structures established by the Shevardnadze regime, to consolidate his 
new power structures, to step up international support and attract foreign direct investment, 
and to promote his libertarian reform agenda. The better fit of the international anti-corruption 
agenda and the political preferences of the incumbents in Georgia as well as the country’s 
dependency on foreign aid largely explain why it has a much better record in fighting 
corruption than Azerbaijan and Armenia. 
                                                 
14
  Freedom House 2008: Nations in Transit; Country Report on Georgia, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=452&year=2008 (last access 27 November 2010). 
15
  European Commission 2005: European Neighbourhood Policy - Country Report Georgia, COM(2005) 72 
final. 
16
  WorlddataBank; http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do; last access 3 December 2010. 
17
  Freedom House 2007: Nations in Transit; Country Report on Georgia, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=423&year=2007 (last access 27 November 2010). 
20 
5. Conclusion 
The Southern Caucasus is a least likely case for External Europeanization. With the ENP, the 
EU has developed a sophisticated framework to transform the domestic structures of former 
Soviet republics ridden by bad governance. But misfit is high, and in the absence of a 
membership perspective the EU has little to offer to pay-off at least some of the adaptation 
costs. Nor has the EU exerted much pressure for adaptation, relying on assistance and 
political dialogue rather than (negative) conditionality. Finally, there are hardly any reform 
coalitions the EU could empower. While according to our expectations we should not see 
much domestic change, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan have responded to the EU’s 
demand for good governance. Georgia has been most active in fighting corruption. The EU’s 
anti-corruption policies resonated with the political agenda of the Shaakashvili government 
lowering the costs of adaptation. At the same time, the EU and other Western donors 
promised to support the fight against corruption by additional financial means and closer 
cooperation. Armenia is as dependent on international assistance as Georgia. Its ruling elite 
has been less enthusiastic in fighting corruption but started to enact policies when external 
pressure rose. Even Azerbaijan, which has been most reluctant to endorse the EU’s good 
governance agenda and is least dependent on external resources, established similar 
institutions and policies as its two neighbours. Finally, all three regimes have implemented 
anti-corruption measures that have taken some effects. Thus, the EU does have an impact on 
countries that lack a membership perspective even if costs of adaption are high, external 
pressure is low and there are no liberal reform coalitions to pull EU policies down to the 
domestic level. Europeanization is driven by the differential empowerment of incumbent 
elites that align their preference for power consolidation with the EU’s demand for domestic 
change. Corruption is fought where it helps to oust political opponents, deflect international 
criticism, and attract foreign assistance and investments. Due to differences in statehood and 
democracy, Europeanization has taken different effects in the three countries (see figure 3). 
While it has given rise to similar institutional changes, behavioural practices and the overall 
impact on corruption differ. Georgia, which is the most democratic but suffers from most 
serious problems of limited statehood, has used anti-corruption measures to strengthen its 
statehood by improving the capacity of state institutions to enforce public policies and 
fostering economic growth. In Azerbaijan, the least democratic regime, the incumbent elites 
has instrumentalized the fight against corruption to oust political opponents. In Armenia, 
which has been stuck in transition and shows the highest degree of statehood, the 
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implementation of anti-corruption measures has been mostly symbolic to deflect international 
criticism and ensure the flow of foreign aid and investments, particularly of its Diaspora. 
Given the better fit between the EU’s demand for good governance and the preferences of the 
Saakashvili government, Georgia has made greater progress in reducing corruption levels than 
Azerbaijan, and particularly Armenia, where corruption even increased. Yet, in all three 
countries, the incumbent elites have ultimately captured the EU’s anti-corruption agenda to 
tighten their control over the allocation of resources within the political system and to attract 
additional resources from the outside. Europeanization can trigger domestic institutional 
change in third countries that suffer from low levels of statehood and democracy and 
(therefore) lack an accession perspective, if it empowers incumbent elites. Rather than 
transforming structures, however, Europeanization helps to stabilize the political and 
economic structures of neighbourhood countries. While they improved their statehood, the 
level of democracy has remained quite stable on a rather low level (see figure 3). 
Figure 3: Democracy and Statehood in the Southern Caucasus 
 Armenia Georgia Azerbaijan 
Statehood 8,8 (2010) 4,0 (2003) 
6,3 (2010) 
2,0 (2003) 
7,0 (2010) 
3,0 (2003) 
Democracy 5 (2010) 6 (2003) 
4 (2010) 
4 (2003) 
5.5 (2010) 
5.5 (2003) 
Source:  
Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) 2003 and 2010, available at 
http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/bti/ranking/ (last access 27 November 
2010). The values combine data from two indicators of BTI, namely the degree to which a 
state enjoys a monopoly over the means of violence and the extent to which it has basic 
administrative capacities The scale ranges from 1 (failed state) to 10 (consolidated state), cf. 
Börzel and Risse forthcoming. 
Freedom House 2003 and 2010, available at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15 (last access 27 November 2010). The 
scale ranges from 1 (free) to 7 (not free). 
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